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COMMENTS

Attorney Fees: Attorney Fees, Prevailing Parties, and
Judicial Discretion in Oklahoma Practice: How It Is, How
It Should Be*
I. Introduction
"Who won?" may seem like a simple question. In the labyrinth of attorney
fee awards in Oklahoma, however, the answer is not always clear. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit once predicted that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court would one day hold that trial courts have the discretion to
determine the prevailing party in a lawsuit for purposes of attorney fee awards.'
Since that forecast in 1991, the Tenth Circuit has changed its mind regarding the
likely direction the Oklahoma Supreme Court will take on this issue.2 The Tenth
Circuit based its about-face on two opinions issued by the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals.3 Neither of these rulings served to clarify the question of how
attorney fees should be awarded and, as recently as June 2003, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has specifically declined to comment on this issue.4 Thus, the
confusion persists.
In Oklahoma, a litigant's right to recover attorney fees is governed by the
American Rule, which requires a statutory or contractual basis for the allowance
of an award.5 Despite its pronouncement in City National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Owens6 that trial courts have the equitable power to award attorney fees, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has interpreted this decision narrowly, carving out
* The author would like to thank Dino Viera for the topic idea, Professor Judith Maute
for topic development, Natalie McNeil for superior editing, and Mom and Daddy for everything
else.
1. See Adair State Bank v. Am. Cas. Co., 949 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1991). The Tenth
Circuit, in construing title 36, section 3629(B) of the Oklahoma Statutes, stated that "shall"
means to mandate, while "allowable" indicates discretion. Id. at 1078. The court then opined
that the Oklahoma legislature, in crafting the statute in question as "attorney fees shall be
allowable to the prevailing party," intended to give the trial judge full discretion for the award.
Id.
2. See Stauth v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 236 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2001).
3. See Williams v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 1995 OK CIV APP 128, 907 P.2d 1105; Shadoan
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1994 OK CIV APP 182, 894 P.2d 1140.
4. See Spears v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 OK 66, 1 14 n.5, 73 P.3d 865, 870 n.5 ("We
express no opinion as to whether the word 'allowable' . . . means fees to the prevailing party are
mandatory or discretionary.").
5. Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 OK 55, 46, 11 P.3d 162, 178-79.
6. 1977 OK 86, 565 P.2d 4.
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only limited exceptions to the American Rule.7 Thus, a statutory or contractual
provision must authorize attorney fees before Oklahoma courts can grant them.8
Generally speaking, fee-shifting statutes mandate that courts award fees to the
"prevailing party," which has been defined most often as either the party who
(1) has an affirmative judgment in its favor; or (2) has secured a net recovery on
its own claim.9
The day has come for the Oklahoma Supreme Court to grant trial judges full
discretion to determine ifattomey fees should be awarded, to whom they should
be awarded, and how much that party should actually receive.'° The goal of this
comment is to provide meaningful guidelines for the award of attorney fees and
to encourage the Oklahoma Supreme Court to make a definitive ruling in an area
that causes practicing attorneys - plaintiffs bar and defense counsel alike much frustration.
Part II of this comment discusses the American Rule. Part I then addresses
the various fee-shifting statutes in Oklahoma, while Part IV examines the
interpretation of those statutes to date. Part V of this comment contends that
Oklahoma should abandon the mechanistic formula used to identify the
prevailing party and trigger fee-shifting because it too often leads to unjust
results. Instead, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should establish a rule of law
giving trial courts the discretion to determine the prevailing party. Next, Part VI
outlines support for this recommendation among extant Oklahomajurisprudence
and case law from other jurisdictions that have adopted a discretionary rule.
Part VII of this comment elaborates on these sources by suggesting specific
guidelines for trial courts to apply in determining the prevailing party for
purposes of attorney fee awards. Finally, Part VIII concludes by recommending
a course of action for the Oklahoma legislature.
II. The American Rule
A. Definition
"American attitudes ...tend to regard litigation as everyone's right and to
emphasize the importance of not excessively hindering access to justice."'1

7. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Barnes 46, 11 P.3d at 179; Keel v. Covey, 1952 OK 86,131,241 P.2d 954,

958.
9. Smith v. Jenkins, 19940K 43, 1 11,873 P.2d 1044, 1047.
10. Trial courts were granted the discretion to determine the "reasonable amount" of an
attorney fee award in State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, 1979 OK 115, 598 P.2d 659.
11. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A CriticalOverview,
1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 656 (1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss4/17
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Indeed, the American Rule is so named because the United States is unique
among industrialized countries in its approach to attorney fee awards.' 2 Under
the American Rule, parties to a lawsuit are generally expected to pay their own
costs. 3 Supporters of the American Rule argue that it preserves democratic
access to the courts. 4 Because each party bears only its own expenses under the
American Rule, less affluent litigants are not faced with the specter of paying
more if they lose, and thus are not dissuaded from pursuing their actions via the
judicial system.'"
Oklahoma first adopted the American Rule in Keel v. Covey. 6 In Keel, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court advanced the general proposition that "[t]he right to
recover attorneys' fees from one's opponent in litigation as a part of the costs
thereof does not exist at common law. Such an item of expense is not allowable
in the absence of a statute or of some agreement expressly authorizing the taxing
of attorneys' fees....""
B. Exceptions to the American Rule
Despite its apparent rigidity, the American Rule has certain exceptions.
Because the basic assumption of American jurisprudence is that the prevailing
party, however such is defined, will not be awarded attorney fees, the threshold
inquiry at the close of any case is two-fold: (1) whether the court is authorized
to make any fee award; and (2) whether the fee applicant satisfies the principles
upon which the award is based.' 8 For example, courts may award attorney fees
based on the equitable doctrines of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment in
cases resulting in a common fund or common benefit. 9 Courts may also award

12. Id. at 651.
13. 1 ALBA CONTE, ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS § 1.3 (2d ed. 1993). Thus, under the
American Rule, a "prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys'
fee from the loser." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
14. See, e.g., Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and DiscouragingDoubtful Litigation: A
Golden Anniversary View of Pleading,Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Underthe
FederalRules of Civil Procedure,67 N.C.L. REv. 1023, 1061 n.249 (1989); Rowe, supra note
11, at 656.
15. Louis, supra note 14, at 1061.
16. 1952 OK 86, 241 P.2d 954.
17. Id. 31,241 P.2d at 958. The court ultimately ruled that because the Oklahoma
legislature had authorized the allowance of attorney fees in some statutes, but not in the statute
governing the claim, the prevailing party's request for fees could not be granted. Id. 33, 241
P.2d at 958-59.
18. 1 CONTE,supranote 13, § 1.03.
19. Id.
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attorney fees to sanction parties who have acted in bad faith. 20 Finally, courts
21
may award attorney fees if so authorized by a contractual or statutory grant.
The authorizing statute generally sets forth the governing requirements for
fee-shifting.2 The party seeking an attorney fee award must demonstrate that
it has satisfied these requirements to "prevail" and thus be eligible for an
award.2 3 The governing requirements generally promote the policies inherent
in the exceptions to the American Rule,24 such as deterrence of wrongdoing and
victim compensation.' Other justifications for fee-shifting include: (1) being
fair to the winner; (2) making the litigant financially whole; (3) deterring or
punishing misconduct or both; (4) rewarding the "private attorney general" who
advances an important public issue; (5) equalizing the relative strengths of the
parties, especially when the government is a party; and (6) promoting judicial
economy.26
C. Fee-Shifting Statutes as Applied
A common criticism of fee-shifting statutes is that they have "much greater
impact on ordinary, risk-averse persons than on those with assets and familiarity
with the litigation process. ' ' " Another view, however, is that the availability of
fees may incentivize attorneys to bring suit on behalf of litigants who would
otherwise be unable to pay, or whose suits involve injunctive relief or nominal
damages only. 28 Litigation is expensive and most lawyers are unwilling and
unable to work solely for "psychic gratification."29 Without fee-shifting statutes,
important civil rights claims, among others, could go unvindicated.3 °
In principle, these policy justifications should guide courts when applying
fee-shifting statutes. 3' However, whether any of these common justifications

20. Id. Oklahoma recognized the application of these exceptions to the American Rule in
City NationalBank & Trust Co. v. Owens, 1977 OK 86, 1 12, 565 P.2d 4, 7.
21. 1 CONTE, supra note 13, § 1.03. This comment focuses on statutory exceptions to the
American Rule.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 1.02.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 1.04.
26. Rowe, supra note 11, at 653.
27. Louis, supra note 14, at 1060.
28. MICHAEL G. COLLINS, SECTION 1983 LmGATION 191 (1997).
29. Id. at 193.
30. Id. In a typical breach of contract suit, however, whether fee-shifting statutes work for
good or ill depends largely upon the sophistication of the litigants and their counsel, the clarity
of the fee-shifting statutes being interpreted, and the dexterity of the judges administering the
awards, rather than on some underlying policy justification.
3 1. Rowe, supra note 11, at 666.
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actually apply to the Oklahoma fee-shifting statutes at issue in this comment is
debatable. In reality, the rationales often overlap, with various justifications
bolstering different aspects of the fee-shifting scheme.32 Thus, a monolithic
"if/then" rule based on the particular policy - if any - behind the statutes may
not be easily discerned or applied. Allowing courts to exercise discretion in
making attorney fee awards would better ensure that courts consider and apply
ajustifiable rationale in determining which party prevailed and whether its costs
should be paid.
III. Fee-Shifting Statutes in Oklahoma
In interpreting the fee-shifting statutes in Oklahoma, courts have focused
more on determining what is a "reasonable fee" than on determining who is a
"prevailing party." Despite clear guidelines regarding the former, there is a
dearth of guidance as to the latter. The Oklahoma legislature has not assisted
courts in their endeavor to define the prevailing party; indeed, the linguistic
variations in Oklahoma's fee-shifting statutes cry out for a more consistent
approach.
When construing statutory language, courts routinely assign words in statutes
their ordinary meaning unless the legislative history clearly establishes a
contrary intention.33 Thus, inconsistent statutory language necessarily affects
judicial interpretation. The legislature has constructed certain fee-shifting
statutes in such a way that discretion seems to be the legislative intent, even
without the Oklahoma Supreme Court so holding.' 4 Other fee-shifting statutes
are more ambiguous. The resulting variations in judicial interpretation have
made the statutes more ambiguous still. The Oklahoma legislature has
employed no fewer than six different constructions in its fee-shifting statutes.
A. The Six Constructionsof Oklahoma Fee-Shifting Statutes
1. The Court May, in Its Discretion,Award ReasonableAttorney Fees to
the PrevailingParty'
This statutory construction provides courts with the most leeway in awarding
attorney fees. The reference to discretion, however, seems to apply only to the
initial decision to award fees and to the amount of the award rather than to the

32. Id. at 678.
33. Adair State Bank v. Am. Cas. Co., 949 F.2d 1067, 1078 (10th Cir. 1991).
34. See, e.g., infra Parts I.A. 1-2.
35. See, e.g., 78 OKLA. STAT. § 54(c) (2001) ("In any action instituted under the provisions
of this act, the court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party.").
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determination of the prevailing party. This construction exactly parallels that of
the federal Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976.36 Although the
legislative history of that Act explains at length the general purposes of feeshifting, it fails to address in any significant way the definition of "prevailing
party. ' 37 In the face of this lack of congressional guidance, federal courts have
responded by exercising their discretion to determine which party "prevailed"
in a given lawsuit.38 Because the supreme court may look to other jurisdictions - including the federal courts - for guidance when Oklahoma courts
have not addressed a particular issue,3 9 the Oklahoma Supreme Court would be
justified in interpreting this statutory construction according to the federal
model.
2. The PrevailingParty May Be Awarded ReasonableAttorney Fees4'
Again, this construction allows the courts some discretion to award a
reasonable amount of fees by using "may" instead of "shall." This construction
also fails, however, to afford the same discretion to courts determining the
prevailing party.
3. Attorney Fees Shall Be Allowable to the PrevailingParty4
The use of the word "shall" denotes a compulsory award of fees. 2 The
insertion of the term "allowable," however, somewhat softens the mandate to
imply a measure of discretion.43 The resulting construction is ambiguous and

36. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
37. Leading Cases, 115 HARv. L. REv. 457,457 n.4 (2001).
38. Id. at 457.
39. State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, 1979 OK 115, 4, 598 P.2d 659, 660.
40. See, e.g., 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.6(f) (2001). This is the exact language used in the
exemplar statute.
41. See, e.g., 36 OKLA. STAT. § 3629(B) (2001). This statute governs fee-shifting in cases
involving insurance claims. The statute reads:
Upon a judgment rendered to either party, costs and attorney fees shall be
allowable to the prevailing party. For purposes of this section, the prevailing party
is the insurer in those cases where judgment does not exceed written offer of
settlement. In all other judgments the insured shall be the prevailing party.
Id. Note that this statute takes the unusual step of defining the prevailing party, a fact that has
not prevented the issue from being litigated many times.
42. "It is clear that the term 'shall' denotes an affirmative mandate by the Oklahoma
legislature. The term 'is a word of command or mandate, with a compulsory and peremptory
meaning. It denotes exclusion of discretion and signifies an enforceable duty."' Adair State
Bank v. Am. Cas. Co., 949 F.2d 1067, 1077 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 1985 OK
85, 11 n.23, 708 P.2d 1102, 1107 n.23).
43. "We believe that by using the term 'allowable,' the Oklahoma legislature intended to
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has been litigated many times, even though the statute using this construction
actually defines the "prevailing party." The courts' failure to reach consensus
may indicate not only that the construction is ambiguous, but also that
"constructing an adequate bright-line definition of 'prevailing party' is beyond
'
legislative means."45
4. The PrevailingParty Shall Be Allowed a Fee, as Set by the Court'
Courts have interpreted this construction's use of the phrase "shall be
allowed" to mean that the award of attorney fees is mandatory, 7 leaving the
court to determine only the amount of the award. The guidelines established by
State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City4 8 afford the courts wide discretion
in determining the "reasonableness" of the amount. The courts' decisionmaking authority, however, does not extend to deciding which party is the
winner in the first instance.
Oklahoma courts have interpreted the statute employing this construction
many times since it was first adopted in 196 L" This statute is one of several
that may be invoked in breach of contract cases. Courts must therefore decide
entitlement under the claim before the prevailing party issue is reached, ° and
must give effect to the enumerated claims on a case-by-case basis.5 '

lodge discretion with the trial judge." Id. at 1077-78. Had the legislature intended for attorney
fees to be mandatory, "it would have used the phrase 'shall be allowed."' Id.
44. Title 36, section 3629(B) of the Oklahoma Statutes provides in pertinent part that "the
prevailing party is the insurer in those cases where judgment does not exceed written offer of
settlement. In all other judgments the insured shall be the prevailing party." 36 OKLA. STAT.
§ 3629(B).
45. Leading Cases, supranote 37, at 466 n.88.
46. See, e.g., 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 936, 938-940 (2001). Title 12, section 936 is one of the
most frequently invoked fee-shifting statutes in breach of contract cases. James R. Lieber &
Stephanie L. Jones, An Analysis of 12 .S. § 936 (1981): An Attorney Fee to the Prevailing
Party, 59 OKLA. B.J. 3661, 3661 (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part that "in any civil
action to recover for labor or services rendered.... unless otherwise provided by law or the
contract which is the subject of the action, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." 12 OKLA. STAT. § 936.
Much of the analysis in this comment applies directly to section 936 claims.
47. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
48. 1979 OK 115, 598 P.2d 659.
49. See Lieber & Jones, supra note 46, at 3661.
50. Id. at 3665.
51. Id. at 3662. In other words, what constitutes an "open account" or "labor or services"
under the statute is a factual determination. If the court finds that the breach in question did not
involve an open account on a service contract, then fee-shifting is not properly predicated on
this statute.
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Given this contextual approach to defining the various civil actions for which
courts grant attorney fee awards under this statute, a mechanistic definition of
"prevailing party" seems incongruous. One definition of "prevailing party"
cannot realistically or appropriately apply to every situation. The statute does
not include any guidelines, however, for defining this critical term to assist the
courts in making their determinations. The absence of such guidance from the
Oklahoma legislature may be one reason why attorney fee awards are so
frequently litigated.
52
5. The PrevailingParty Shall Be Entitledto Attorney Fees

In this example of statutory construction, the prevailing party is, without
question, "entitled" to attorney fees, and not merely "allowed" fees, as set by the
court. The statutory language does not mention courts' discretion to award a
particular amount, though presumably the prevailing party may request the
amount to which it feels entitled - an amount courts ultimately determine
under Burk.
6. ReasonableAttorney Fees Must Be Awarded to the PrevailingParty'
This is the most inflexible statutory language because it does not contemplate
whether the prevailing party is actually "entitled" to fees. Rather, under a literal
interpretation of this statute, fees shall be awarded as a matter of course. A
mandatory award of attorney fees seems rather draconian given the mechanistic,
inequitable definition of "prevailing party" currently used by Oklahoma courts.
B. The Resulting Confusion Caused by These Six Constructions
The variation in the language of Oklahoma's fee-shifting statutes, when
combined with Oklahoma courts' inconsistent interpretations, has resulted in
much confusion. Ironically, parties continue to litigate attorney fee awards long
after their original disputes have been resolved and, in so doing, continue to
generate even more attorney fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court and the
Oklahoma legislature, however, could mitigate this confusion. The supreme
court could allow total discretion in determining who, if anyone, should receive
attorney fees, while the legislature could redraft the fee-shifting statutes to be
consistent and unambiguous. Under either approach, courts would not be forced
to award attorney fees as a matter of course. Instead, they would have the
discretion under established guidelines to determine which party truly "won" the
case and earned the award. The continuing litigation of Oklahoma's fee-shifting

52. See, e.g., 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1449(A) (2001).
53. See, e.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 5-111(e) (2001).
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statutes wastes limited judicial resources, litigants' money, and attorneys' time.
Adopting a discretionary rule for the award of attorney fees under these statutes
is the first step toward solving the problem.
IV. The Development of Fee-Shifting Case Law in Oklahoma
A. A ChronologicalLook at the Rise and Fall of the DiscretionaryRule in
Oklahoma Courts
Not only are Oklahoma's fee-shifting statutes inconsistent, the courts'
interpretations of the statutes are also inconsistent. In the 1908 case of Chicago,
Rhode Island& PacificRailway Co. v. Mashore, 4 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held a fee-shifting statute to be unconstitutional for failing to provide equal
protection of the law to all parties. 5 Under the statute, defendants had to satisfy
a much higher burden to win attorney fees.56 The Mashoredecision called for
57
a more equitable and flexible means of determining the prevailing party. The
current regime, however, again favors plaintiffs, despite the fact that the
supreme court has never overruled Mashore.
In the 1979 case of State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court adopted several factors for determining whether the amount of
an attorney fee award was reasonable.5 8 Courts have not, however, extended the
logic of Burk to the determination of the prevailing party. Instead, the current
rule in Oklahoma is that, in any case, there is only one prevailing party and one
attorney fee.59 Oklahoma courts most often cite the 1977 Oklahoma Court of
Appeals decision in Quapaw Co. v. Varnell6 to justify this mechanistic
determination of the prevailing party, even though Quapaw is not truly
precedential.
Oklahoma courts have carved out so many exceptions to Quapaw over the
years that, in the 1991 case of Adair State Bank v. American CasualtyCo.,61 the
Tenth Circuit predicted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule that trial
62
courts have full discretion to make attorney fee awards. The Oklahoma Court
of Civil Appeals responded to the Tenth Circuit's prediction a few years later by

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

1908 OK 95, 96 P. 630.
Id. 19, 96 P. at 633.
Id. 17, 96 P. at 633.
Id. [ 24, 96 P. at 634.
State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, 1979 OK 115, 1 8, 598 P.2d 659, 661-62.
Quapaw Co. v. Varnell, 1977 OK CIV APP 19, 1 21, 566 P.2d 164, 167.
1977 OK CIV APP 19, 566 P.2d 164.
949 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1078.
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reinforcing the Quapaw rule in Shadoanv. Liberty Mutual FireInsuranceCo. 63
and in Williams v. Old American Insurance Co. 64 Subsequently, the Tenth
Circuit withdrew its prediction regarding a discretionary rule in the 2001 case
of Stauth v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. 6' by adopting - albeit
reluctantly - the rule of law advanced in Shadoan and Williams.'
In the 2003 case of Spears v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. ,67 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court specifically declined to comment on the issue of a discretionary
rule for making attorney fee awards.' Thus, the nonprecedential - and
nonsensical - rule of Quapaw continues to dictate how Oklahoma courts
decide who the prevailing party is for purposes of awarding attorney fees.
B. The Failuresof Quapaw
Quapaw established the baseline rule in Oklahoma "that there can be only
one prevailing party, and one attorneys' fee."69 Courts have described the
prevailing party fairly consistently as "one who has prevailed on the merits,"7 °
"one that receives the greatest affirmative judgment,"' or "one in whose favor
judgment was rendered."72 Oklahoma courts have allowed so many exceptions,
however, that these definitions ring hollow.
For example, Oklahoma courts have allowed both parties in a lawsuit to
collect attorney fees, despite Quapaw's recognition of only one "prevailing
party" in any given situation. 7 In a number of other cases, courts have deemed
multiple parties entitled to attorney fees under different fee-shifting statutes.74

63. 1994 OK CIV APP 182, 894 P.2d 1140.
64. 1995 OK CIV APP 128,907 P.2d 1105.
65. 236 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2001).
66. Id. at 1267.
67. 2003 OK 66, 73 P.3d 865.
68. Id. 13, 73 P.3d at 870.
69. Quapaw Co. v. Varnell, 1977 OK CIV APP 19, 1 21, 566 P.2d 164, 167; see also
Rambo v. Hicks, 1986 OK 86, 2, 733 P.2d 405, 405 ("We particularly note that the mere
availability of more than one form of remedial relief upon a single cause of action, does not
abrogate the rule that there can be only one prevailing party.").
70. Bullard's Oil Field Serv., Inc. v. Williford Energy Co., 1992 OK 128, 11 n.9, 839
P.2d 185, 189 n.9; Wieland v. Danner Auto Supply, 1984 OK 45, 18, 695 P.2d 1332, 1334.
71. Am. Superior Feeds, Inc. v. Mason Warehouse, Inc., 1997 OK CIV APP 43, 1 4, 943
P.2d 171, 173.
72. Goodwin v. Durant Bank & Trust Co., 1998 OK 3, 10 n.11, 952 P.2d 41,44 n.11.
73. See, e.g., The Co., Inc. v. Trion Energy, 1988 OK 82, 761 P.2d 470. Where the
plaintiff sued the defendant to enforce a lien and collect overdue rent, the trial court found for
the defendant on the lien claim, but granted judgment to the plaintiff for the overdue rent. The
supreme court allowed both parties attorney fees, based on the "wins" on their respective claims.
74. See, e.g., Livestock Sys., Inc. v. Lashley, 1998 OK 68, 9, 967 P.2d 1197, 1199;
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also recognized a blanket exception to the
single prevailing party rule in comparative negligence cases.75 Cases with
unique fact situations may also earn an exception.76 In still other cases, courts
have held that there may not be a prevailing party at all, contrary to the statutory
mandate to award fees.'
These exceptions illustrate the failure of Oklahoma courts to adhere in
practice to a strict definition of "prevailing party." The rule of Quapaw is
simply too myopic to meet the demands of modem complex litigation. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the problem. In Professional
Credit Collections v. Smith,78 the court stated that "[tihe definition of a
prevailing party cannot be narrowly confined to one who obtains judgment after
a trial on the merits."" 9 Instead, the court found that "[t]he operative factor [for
making an attorney fee award] ... is success. "80
Indeed, if fee-shifting is primarily an equitable device, courts can better
achieve justice by analyzing the particulars of each case, rather than by
following a rigid formulaic approach. 1 Courts may need to consider many
factors in determining what constitutes "success." Courts exercising their own
discretion are "simply better equipped to advance congressional goals when
determining whether a party has prevailed 82 because they focus on the facts
83
rather than on "procedural machinations.. . unrelated to the merits" of the
case.

Welling v. Am. Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 1980 OK 131, 1 17, 617 P.2d 206, 210; Sooner
Pipe & Supply Corp., 1968 OK 164, 21, 447 P.2d 758, 762 (granting fees to the plaintiffs
under title 12, section 936 and to the defendants under title 42, section 176 of the Oklahoma
Statutes in all cases).
75. See Smith v. Jenkins, 1994 0K43,[16, 873 P.2d 1044,1049 ("The single-party-victory
approach to an allowance of attorney's fee in this case would offend the comparative negligence
Today's departure from our general counsel-fee regime under prevailing party
regime ....
statutes will apply only in comparative-negligence cases to claims and compulsory
counterclaims for the same tortious event.").
76. See, e.g., Prof 1Credit Collections, Inc. v. Smith, 1997 OK 19, 1 16,933 P.2d 307,311
(finding that the defendant was the prevailing party because she successfully vacated a prior
default judgment rendered against her).
77. See, e.g., Arkla Energy Res. v. Roye Realty & Dev., Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 866 (10th Cir.
1993).
78. 1997 OK 19, 933 P.2d 307.
79. Id. 12, 933 P.2d at 311.
80. Id.
81. See Leading Cases, supra note 37, at 458.
82. Id. at 466.
83. Id. at 467.
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Furthermore, applying a mechanistic test to determine the prevailing party is
potentially at odds with the constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection.' 4 Quapaw and other decisions imply that defendants must prevail on
all of plaintiffs' claims to be successful, while plaintiffs need only obtain a
partial recovery on one of several claims. In ProfessionalCreditCollections,
the court rejected this interpretation and expressly stated that Oklahoma's feeshifting statutes could not be interpreted in a way that would treat victorious
plaintiffs differently than victorious defendants "[b]ecause equal protection
' 86
demands like treatment.
Oklahoma courts have further criticized Quapawas being out of step with the
realities of complex modem litigation.87 The Oklahoma courts' wide-ranging
interpretations of Quapaw illustrate a steady retreat from the rigid application
of the fee-shifting statutes. Certainly, the widespread criticism of Quapawhas
eroded its persuasive value. Because the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not yet
spoken, however, the current state of Oklahoma jurisprudence regarding the
award of attorney fees is still officially in flux.
C. Recent Failuresof Oklahoma Courts to Clarify the PrevailingParty
Standard
Two recent Oklahoma Supreme Court cases have addressed, but not resolved,
the prevailing party issue. In Spears v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., the court
acknowledged the competing viewpoints of the Tenth Circuit and the Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals.88 The court did not, however, create any precedent.

84. Prof'l Credit Collections 14, 933 P.2d at 311.
85. See, e.g., Roye Realty & Dev. Co. v. Arkia, Inc., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3352, at **3940 & n.23 (10th Cir. 1996).
86. Profl Credit Collections 14, 933 P.2d at 311.
87. Stites v. Duit Constr. Co., 1999 OK CIV APP 113, 15, 992 P.2d 913, 916-17. The
Stites court noted several departures from Quapaw:
This application of Quapaw... is inconsistent with Welling v. American Roofing
and Sheet Metal Co., Inc., 1980 OK 131, 617 P.2d 206 and Midwest Livestock
Systems, Inc. v. Lashley, 1998 OK 68, 967 P.2d 1197. In both cases, the court
concluded both parties who received affirmative judgments in their favor were
entitled to attorney fees and costs. Midwest Livestock Systems specifically rejected
the argument that the party with the greatest affirmative judgment was the only
prevailing party.
Id.
88. Spears v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 OK 66, 13 n.5, 73 P.3d 865, 865 n.5 (referring
to the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Adair State Bank v. American CasualtyCo., 949 F.2d 1067
(10th Cir. 1991), that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would likely grant trial courts full discretion
to determine the prevailing party, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals opinions in
Shadoan v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 1994 OK CIV APP 182, 894 P.2d 1140, and
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Indeed, in the most recent case dealing with the prevailing party issue, Tibbetts
v. Sight 'n Sound Appliance Centers, Inc.,89 the court adhered to the more
traditional view that a plaintiff who seeks only monetary damages but is, in fact,
awarded none, is not a prevailing party. Thus, the supreme court seems to rely
on the construction that discretion is not preferred, although it has not explicitly
contradicted or adopted the reasoning of either the Tenth Circuit or the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.
In 1994, Shadoanbecame the first Oklahoma case to disagree with the Tenth
Circuit's original prediction that an award of attorney fees was discretionary
with the trial courts. In Shadoan,the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that
the Tenth Circuit was wrong to designate the word "allowable" as the statute's
operative word because it seemed "odd, to say the least, that [the legislature]
chose to precede the supposedly operative word 'allowable' with one which
possesses such a well-established mandatorymeaning [i.e., "shall"]."9° Williams
acquiesced in this view. 9'
Relying on Shadoan and Williams, the Tenth Circuit in Stauth reversed its
prediction regarding the determination of the prevailing party for purposes of
attorney fees. 92 The current theory of Oklahoma jurisprudence regarding the
award of attorney fees rests on this rather reluctant opinion. In Stauth, the Tenth
Circuit held that awarding fees under title 36, section 3629(B) of the Oklahoma
Statutes is mandatory. 93 The court noted, however, that the statutory language
"presents an arguable question of interpretation"' and conceded merely that a
'
mandatory award in the instant case was justifiable "under the circumstances." 95
The Tenth Circuit questioned the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals finding that
"shall" was the operative word of the fee-shifting statute, focusing instead on the
more flexible word "allowable." The Tenth Circuit further recognized the
irony that "the standard of review for a denial of attorneys' fees is an abuse of
discretion standard," 97 even though trial courts are not actually accorded any
discretion under these opinions.

Williams v. Old American Insurance Co., 1995 OK CIV APP 128, 907 P.2d 1105, which
rebutted the Tenth Circuit's prediction).
89. 2003 OK 72,77 P.3d 1042 (interpreting title 15, section 751 of the Oklahoma Statutes).
90. Shadoan 14, 894 P.2d at 1144.
91. Williams 16, 907 P.2d at 1107.
92. Stauth v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 236 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2001).
93. Id. at 1267.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1262.
96. Id. at 1267.
97. Id. at 1263.
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D. The Lack of True Precedent
Of course, neither the case law of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals nor
that of the Tenth Circuit is truly precedential.98 To settle this question of state
law, either the Oklahoma Supreme Court must issue a definitive ruling, or the
Oklahoma legislature must redraft the fee-shifting statutes to provide clearer
guidance. The supreme court's explicit refusal to address the issue in Spears
brings this need to the fore. 9 So long as the court and the legislature decline to
address this issue, the confusion will persist.
V. Criticismof the CurrentRegime
A. Inherent Inequity in the Definition of PrevailingParty
The current method of defining "prevailing party" is inequitable. The
interpretation of most of Oklahoma's fee-shifting statutes is that prevailing
plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to attorney fees, while prevailing defendants
usually receive awards only in special circumstances, despite having been
involuntarily haled into court.'" When the fee-shifting statutes are thus applied,
they violate the federal equal protection clause'0 1 and the Oklahoma
Constitution"° because they are not neutral, as is required for the
"administration ofjustice without prejudice.""0 3 If "equal access to the courts,
and modes of procedure therein, constitute basic and fundamental rights,"'"
then any construction of Oklahoma's fee-shifting statutes that treats plaintiffs
and defendants differently without any rational basis or legitimate state purpose
is unconstitutional.' 0 5

98. The duty of a federal court is to conform to the substantive law of the state. Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 87 (1938). If the supreme court of the state has not provided
direction on a particular question of law, the federal court must predict the course of action that
body would take if it were deciding the issue. Fransen v. Conoco, Inc., 64 F.3d 1481, 1492 n. 10
(10th Cir. 1995). The federal court is not bound by the decisions of a state's lower courts; those
decisions are merely persuasive, not precedential. Id.
99. See Spears v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 OK 66, 1 13 n.5, 73 P.3d 865, 865 n.5.
100. See, e.g., Roye Realty & Dev., Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3352, at
**39-40 & n.23 (10th Cir. 1996).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
102. OKILA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
103. Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1980 OK 95, 1 2, 613 P.2d 1041, 1042.
104. Id. 15, 613 P.2d at 1044.
105. Id.; see also Prof 1 Credit Collections, Inc. v. Smith, 1997 OK 19, 1 14,933 P.2d 307,
311.
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Indeed, "a superior claim or defense on the merits does not automatically
translate into superior equity on fees."'" In close cases in which both sides have
justifiable positions, it seems harsh and unfair to allocate the attorney fees of
both parties to the "winner" who may have prevailed on a mere technicality. °7
Oklahoma's mechanistic method of defining the prevailing party often leads to
unjust results, which may "cast the loser assessed for fees in the role of one
unfairly and severely punished for proceeding entirely reasonably. Though he
may have lost, he acted not only within his rights but with good foundation in
contesting the case."1 °8
1. Inequity Regarding PrevailingPlaintiffs
Even a seemingly routine award of attorney fees can result in inequity. For
example, plaintiffs may be awarded a nominal recovery entitling them to
attorney fees under a given statute, only to have the fee reduced because it is not
"reasonable" or "proportional" in relation to the award, even though the issue
they advanced was of state-wide importance. Such a result is possible under the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Parker Pest Control, Inc., °9 which stated that "the attorney fee should bear
some reasonable relationship to the amount in controversy" and to the amount
actually recovered."'
A case in point is the recently decided Tibbetts v. Sight 'n Sound Appliance
Centers, Inc. The plaintiffs in Tibbetts brought a class action lawsuit against
Sight 'n Sound seeking monetary damages for injuries suffered from reliance on
"bait and switch" advertising."' Although the jury determined that the
defendant had violated the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act,"2 the plaintiffs
were awarded zero damages." 3 Stating that "[a] more poignant example of a
lack of success would be hard to imagine, 11 4 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court's holding that no attorney fees could be awarded in
the case because no damages were awarded.' ' Arguably, however, the plaintiffs

106. Rowe, supra note 11, at 655.

107. Id. at 656.
108. Id. at 670.
109. 1987 OK 16,737 P.2d 1186.
110. Arkoma Gas Co. v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 1993 OK 27,

6, 849 P.2d 392, 394 (citing

Southwestern Bell 17, 737 P.2d at 1189).
111. Tibbetts v. Sight 'n Sound Appliance Ctrs., Inc., 2003 OK 72, 1 0,77 P.3d 1042, 1044.
112. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 751 (2001).
113. Tibbetts 1, 77 P.3d at 1045.
114. Id. 1 13, 77 P.3d at 1050.
115. Id. 25, 77 P.3d at 1054. The plaintiffs attorney in Tibbetts worked for a contingency

fee. Had the attorney worked for an hourly rate, the court may have reached a different
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had struck an important blow for consumer rights in Oklahoma, and the court
should have rewarded their attorneys, who estimated their costs and fees in
excess of $1 million and their total hours on the case at 7000,16 for their
efforts. "7
2. Inequity Regarding PrevailingDefendants
The bar for prevailing defendants to recover attorney fees is very high.
Generally, defendants must receive a completely favorable verdict to recover
attorney fees. Moreover, courts frequently limit defendants' attorney fee awards
to instances in which the plaintiffs have exhibited bad faith."' In civil rights
cases, this differential treatment is explained by the potential chilling effect that
regular defendant awards could have on litigation that arguably benefits society
as a whole." 9 In cases not involving individuals' substantive rights, however,
defendants might more rightly be considered the prevailing party where the
courts award plaintiffs a nominal amount but do not render a new rule of law.
For example, in Gamble, Simmons & Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,120 the district
court awarded the plaintiff less than 10% of the damages sought, and ordered the
plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorney fees. 121 This percentage of the
plaintiffs recovery failed to account, however, for the dismissal of two causes
of action for which damages were never quantified. 122 The Tenth Circuit
remanded these issues for further consideration and reversed the award of
attorney fees because it recognized that the outcome on remand might inspire the
trial court to "alter its decision regarding the amount of attorney fees to award
or perhaps even change who qualifies as the 'prevailing party. '123
Schwartz v. FarmersInsurance Co. 124 is an analogous case decided under
Arizona's discretionary rule. In Schwartz, the plaintiffs argued that they were
the prevailing party for purposes of the attorney fee award because they had

conclusion.
116. Id. 18,77 P.3d at 1048.
117. Note that this comment asserts this interpretation for the sake of argument only. The
Tibbetts court specifically rejected the "catalyst" theory of awarding attorney fees, as the
defendants were not forced to alter their practices. Only when the defendant is required to take
action pursuant to judicial sanction is the catalyst theory viable. Id. 23, 77 P.3d at 1053.
118. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Owens, 1977 OK 86, 12, 565 P.2d 4, 7.
119. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chandelle Club, 506 F. Supp. 75, 76 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
120. 175 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 1999).
121. Id. at 773.
122. Id. at 765.
123. Id. at 774.
124. 800 P.2d 20 (Ariz. 1990).
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obtained a money judgment but the defendant had not. 25 The defendant,
however, successfully defended the plaintiffs' bad faith claim, thereby limiting
the plaintiffs' overall recovery to much less than they had originally sought. 126
The trial court held, and the appellate court affirmed, that the defendant was the
prevailing party, considering the totality of the circumstances, and awarded the
defendant a portion of the fees and all of the costs it incurred in defending both
claims. 127 Given the similarity of the facts of these cases, the court in Gamble,
Simmons could have reached the same result as the court in Schwartz, but for
Oklahoma's mechanistic and arguably unconstitutional interpretation of its feeshifting statutes.
3. No PrevailingParty
In still other cases, courts may not designate a prevailing party at all because
they find neither party deserving of attorney fees. This result occurred in
Tibbetts when both sides moved for attorney fees and lost.'28 In Tibbetts, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized the plaintiffs were not obliged to pay their
counsel unless they were awarded damages. Because nothing was recovered,
the court could not justify the requested attorney fee of $375,000.129 The court
opined that "it would put form over substance to actually consider plaintiffs to
be the prevailing or successful parties as they recovered nothing from
defendant,"' 13 nor could the court consider the defendant to be the prevailing
party. In essence, then, the supreme court literally applied the American Rule,
and each side paid its own costs."' The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however,
unlike other courts, 132 has never explicitly stated that trial courts have the
discretion to do what the Tibbets court did based on prevailing party status.

125. Id. at 25.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Tibbetts v. Sight 'n Sound Appliance Ctrs., 2003 OK 72, 1 7, 77 P.3d 1042, 1048.
129. Id. 10-11, 77 P.3d at 1049.
130. Id. 18, 77 P.3d at 1051-52.
131. See 1 CONTE, supra note 13, § 1.3.
132. See, e.g., Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C.R. Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312,314 (Alaska 1972)
(holding that a court has the power to decide that neither party prevailed). Owen Jones also
supports the proposition that the trial court has the general discretion to determine the prevailing
party. See, e.g., Sardam v. Morford, 756 P.2d 174, 175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (applying Owen
Jones);see also Arkla Energy Res. v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855,865-66 (10th
Cir. 1993).
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4. Multiple PrevailingParties
In addition to courts finding no prevailing party, they may also designate
multiple prevailing parties, all of whom are entitled to attorney fees. The
Oklahoma comparative negligence regime already contemplates this
possibility.'33 Several Oklahoma courts have found multiple prevailing parties
outside of the comparative negligence realm, where "special circumstances" so
warranted.134 Oklahoma courts have also awarded attorney fees to multiple

parties in the same case. 35 Because courts do not always follow Quapaw, the
next logical step would be for the Oklahoma courts to retire Quapaw and other
rigid fee-shifting rules altogether in favor of leaving the prevailing party inquiry
to the trial courts' discretion in all instances.
B. ConstitutionalInfirmity in Oklahoma Courts'Applicationof Fee-Shifting
Statutes
The anomaly of the results in Oklahoma's attorney fee award cases suggests
a constitutional infirmity in the courts' application of fee-shifting statutes. The
standards for plaintiffs to prevail on the issue of attorney fees are much less
strict than those for defendants, resulting in potential equal protection violations.
Courts presume that statutes are constitutional and will strike them only if
they are "clearly, palpably and plainly inconsistent" with constitutional
dictates.' 36 If a litigant challenges the constitutionality of a statute on the basis
that it impedes equal access to the judicial system, the court must employ the
13 7
strict scrutiny standard of review.
In 1908, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Chicago, Rhode Island &
38
PacificRailway Co. v. Mashorethat a fee-shifting statute was unconstitutional
because it authorized an award of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff but not
to a prevailing defendant.'39 The Oklahoma Supreme Court cited a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution:
The statute providing the assessment of attorney's fees in cases of
this character is violative of the fourteenth amendment of the

133. See, e.g., Lee v. Griffith, 1999 OK 32, 7, 990 P.2d 232, 233; Smith v. Jenkins, 1994
OK 43,[ 13, 873 P.2d 1044, 1048.
134. See supra notes 73-74, 76 and accompanying text.
135. Id.
136. Alford v. Garzone, 1998 OK CIV APP 105, 7,964 P.2d 944,946 (quoting Reherman
v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 1984 OK 12, 11,679 P.2d 1296, 1300).
137. Id. 1 10, 964 P.2d at 947.
138. See Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Mashore, 1908 OK 95, 19, 96 P. 630, 633.
139. Id. 17, 96 P. at 633.
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Constitution of the United States, in that it does not give to all parties
the same, equal protection of the law. The defendant, being sued for
wages under this statute, is not on an equal footing with the plaintiff.
If he makes an unsuccessful defense, he is mulcted in an attorney's
fee, to be paid to the plaintiff, while if he is successful, the plaintiff
is not required to pay any attorney's fee to him. In other words,
justice is not dispensed, with an impartial and equal hand, to these
litigants. A court is always loath to hold a statute, the solemn act of
the Legislature, unconstitutional and void, and never does so, except
where its provisions make this duty a plain and imperative one. In
the present case we have examined a large number of authorities
wherein the constitutionality of such statutes has been raised, and in
every one of them the court of last resort has held it
unconstitutional. 1" °
Certain Oklahoma Supreme Court justices have advocated to continue the
efficacy of Mashore. 4' Indeed, Mashore is still good precedent, although the
court now acts as if it were constrained by the conflicting - but
nonprecedential - decisions rendered by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
and the Tenth Circuit since Mashore. The lurking constitutional questions
behind Oklahoma's mechanistic approach to fee-shifting statutes provide fertile
grounds for a discussion ofjudicial discretion and legislative reform in this area.
V1. The Casefor a DiscretionaryRule
The Tenth Circuit has stated that "[t]he determinations of which party
prevailed in the litigation and the reasonableness of the attorney's fees award...
fall within the discretion of the trial judge and are reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard."' 4 2 If the trial court has discretion to determine prevailing
party status, it follows that courts' rulings on attorney fees should be made on
a case-by-case basis, depending on the overall litigation result. Indeed, "[t]here
is no overarching organizing principle to determine when an attorney fee award
is appropriate ....

Awarding attorney fees depends on the totality of the

circumstances involved in each particular case."' 43 The Oklahoma Supreme

140. Id. 19, 96 P. at 633.
141. See, e.g., Alford 12 n.5, 964 P.2d at 948 n.5 (discussing Justice Opala's concurrence
in Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1980 OK 95, 613 P.2d 1041).
142. Strickland Tower Maint., Inc. v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 128 F.3d 1422, 1428
(10th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted).
143. In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., 87 F.3d 406, 410 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Court should adopt the Tenth Circuit's reasoning to rectify the confusion and
inequities caused by the current rule of law regarding prevailing party status.
A. The Burk ReasonablenessStandardand the Policy Behind Fee-Shifting
Under current Oklahoma jurisprudence, trial courts enjoy wide discretion
under State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City in determining whether the
amount of the attorney fees is "reasonable," but not in determining which party
should receive the award. To assess the reasonableness of attorney fee awards
under Burk, trial courts must first determine the number of hours that the
attorneys spent on the case and multiply that number by their hourly rate.'"
Courts must then assess certain variables that may also affect the attorneys'
compensation, including, but not limited to: (1) the time and labor involved; (2)
the novelty and complexity of the issues; (3) the desired recovery; (4) the results
actually obtained; and (5) the nature of the case. 1 45 These criteria are also
obviously relevant to the question of who deserves to recover at all.
The general justifications for fee-shifting may also affect how courts
calculate fees.' 46 Because the goals of awarding fees include such divergent
aims as making the injured party whole and punishing the wrongdoer, the
"reasonable" amount to award may rest on grounds well beyond the prevailing
party's actual costs.'47 This is particularly true when the attorney fee award is
discretionary. Under a mandatory fee-shifting statute, an award to the prevailing
party in a close case might not serve any particular goal of equity, incentive, or
public policy, but will be made nonetheless. Under a discretionary rule,
however, these concerns will be paramount, resulting in an attorney fee award
only in truly deserving cases.
B. Interpretationof Burk Throughout Oklahoma Jurisprudence
Oklahoma courts have construed Burk as requiring judges to consider the
totality of the circumstances in making their decisions regarding the
reasonableness of the amount of the attorney fee award. In Arkoma Gas Co. v.
Otis EngineeringCorp.,'"the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
award of attorney fees, finding that the judge had not abused his discretion in

144. State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, 1979 OK 115, 9 9, 11,598 P.2d 659,66162.
145. Id. 918, 598 P.2d at 661 (quoting Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).
146. Rowe, supra note 11, at 673.
147. Id. at 677.
148. 1993 OK 27, 849 P.2d 392.
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determining the amount of the award or the prevailing party. 4 9 Having recited

the Burk factors, the trial judge stated that he "felt he was required to consider
the entire circumstances to ensure that such award was fair and reasonable under
the circumstances."' 50 In affirming the trial court's award, the supreme court
noted that "[w]hat is reasonable in each case must be considered in light of the
extent to which the plaintiff prevailed."''
Although the Arkoma Gas court confined its review to the amount of the
attorney fee award, "the extent to which the plaintiff prevailed" obviously
involves a value judgment on the trial court's part. In certain cases, the degree
to which plaintiffs prevail may, in fact, justify an award to the defendants. Thus,
the reasoning in Arkoma Gas may be extended to justify a future Oklahoma
Supreme Court decision granting trial courts full discretion to determine the
prevailing party.' 52 Indeed, the "extent to which the parties prevailed" is often
listed as an important factor for courts to consider in the fee-shifting statutes of
most jurisdictions with a discretionary rule.'53
C. The DiscretionaryRule in Other States
Other states have employed variations of the rule suggested by this comment,
although the construction of the fee-shifting statutes and the judicial
interpretation thereof may differ considerably. For example, Arkansas has a
generally permissive rule on attorney fees, but employs a mechanistic approach
in determining the prevailing party,'54 while Idaho has a mandatory rule,
identical to Oklahoma's, and a discretionary approach.' 55 Oklahoma can learn
from each model, with the correct result ultimately being that the trial court's
discretion should extend to deciding whether to allow fees at all, and if so, to
whom and in what amount.

149. Id. 1 8, 849 P.2d at 394-95.
150. Id. 1 4, 849 P.2d at 393.
151. Id. 8, 849 P.2d at 395.
152. At the very least, a ruling to this effect would make the appellate review for "abuse of
discretion" less ironic and more convincing, to paraphrase Strauth v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co., 236 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 2001).
153. See, e.g., Sanders v. Lankford, 1 P.3d 823, 826 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); Shurtliff v.
Northwest Pools, Inc., 815 P.2d 461, 464 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991).
154. See, e.g., Marcum v. Wengert, 40 S.W.3d 230 (Ark. 2001) (discussing, passim, the
statutory and judicial interpretations of fee-shifting statutes).
155. See, e.g., Sanders, 1 P.3d at 826.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:947

1. The Arkansas Model
Arkansas courts enjoy full discretion to decide whether to award attorney fees
in any given case. 5 6 The Arkansas statute employs an explicitly permissive
construction: "In any civil action to recover on an open account, ... unless
otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject matter of the
action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be
assessed by the court and collected as costs."' 57 If, however, the Arkansas court
finds that an attorney fee award is warranted, the court is constrained by the
same "one prevailing party" rule as that set forth in Quapaw.58 Nonetheless,
Arkansas courts are afforded a bit more leeway because the underlying rule is
permissive rather than mandatory.
For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that attorney fees should
be denied altogether when all of the attorneys did an excellent job under the
constraints of state law on a difficult case."' The court has also held that a party
need not recover all of the damages it had sought to be the prevailing party."'6
Arkansas courts are therefore limited to using their discretion to determine
whether to award attorney fees and in what amount.'6 ' Arkansas's appellate
courts, however, give attorney fee awards deferential review because they
routinely recognize that "the trial judge's intimate acquaintance with the trial
proceedings and the quality of service rendered by the prevailing party's
counsel" give the trial judge superior insight into the propriety of the attorney
fee award.'62
The U.S. Supreme Court expressed this same sentiment in Hensley v.
Eckerhart.6 3 The Court reasoned that because the trial court has superior
understanding of the litigation, a discretionary rule prevents frequent appellate
review of what are mostly factual matters.' 64
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has yet to adopt this reasoning. On this point,
Oklahoma should follow Arkansas's lead - and then some.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Gill v. Transcriptions, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Ark. 1995).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (1999) (emphasis added).
See Marcum, 40 S.W.3d at 236.
Jones v. Abraham, 15 S.W.3d 310, 318-19 (Ark. 2000).
Marcum, 40 S.W.3d at 236.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 234-35.
461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
Id.
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2. The Arizona Model
Arizona fee-shifting statutes use permissive language similar to that of
Arkansas. 165 Arizona courts construe their fee-shifting statutes, however, as a
permissive grant of authority that affords trial courts broad discretion,
completely free of any Quapaw-like rule."6 The trial judge need only have a
"reasonable basis" for deciding to award attorney fees, to whom, and in what
amount.'67
Under the Arizona statute, both plaintiffs and defendants may qualify as the
prevailing party, with no disparate treatment, because the attorney fee award is
"remedial in nature and such relief is equally available to those who successfully
defend an action as to those who successfully seek affirmative relief.' 68 The
courts may consider the totality of the circumstances in making their
decisions. 69 Even where the Arizona legislature has constructed a fee-shifting
to determine the
statute in mandatory terms, 170 the courts have the discretion
171
prevailing party from the totality of the circumstances.
3. The Texas Model
Oklahoma may also look to Texas statutes for a "close, but not quite" model
of interpretation for fee-shifting statutes. Despite permissive language in the
Texas statute stating that attorney fees "may" be awarded,172 the Texas Supreme
Court has held, similarly to Oklahoma, that an award under the statute is
mandatory, 173 at least to the degree that the trial court "does not have the
discretion to completely deny attorneys' fees if they are proper under [the
174
statute].'
165. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(A) (2003) ("In any contested action
arising out of a contract, express or implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable
attorney fees.").
166. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985).
167. Id.
168. Schwartz v. Farmers Ins. Co., 800 P.2d 20, 25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Moses v. Phelps
Dodge Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (D. Ariz. 1983).
169. Schwartz, 800 P.2d at 25.
170. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341 (2003) ("The successful party to a civil
action shall recover from his adversary all costs expended or incurred therein unless otherwise
provided by law.").
171. Hooper v. Truly Nolen of Am., Inc., 832 P.2d 709, 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
172. See, e.g., TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (1986) ("A person may recover
reasonable attorney's fees from an individual or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid
claim and costs ... ").
173. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. PMAC, Ltd., 863 S.W.2d 225, 236 (Tex. App. 1993).
174. Ralph I. Miller & Angela C. Wennihan, Resolving Attorneys' Fees in Texas Business
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Texas defines the prevailing party inquiry as a factual issue uniquely within
the province of the trial court.' 75 Furthermore, Texas courts recognize a more
generous base definition of "prevailing party." Indeed, in Texas, a party can
76
prevail without maximizing its recovery or even receiving any damages at all. '
Courts may grant attorney fees to plaintiffs and defendants alike. 1 77 Some Texas
statutes are fully discretionary - even a nonprevailing party can recover fees
in some instances. 178 Finally, Texas courts retain full discretion to determine the
79
reasonableness of the amount of the award.1
4. The Alaska Model
Under Alaska law, courts "shall" award attorney fees to the prevailing party
in a civil lawsuit. 8 ° Although the language is mandatory, Alaska courts
construe the statute very liberally. Courts usually define the prevailing party as
the one who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends against
it by prevailing on the main issue, even if not to the extent of the original claim,
or as the one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment
entered.' 8' Recognizing the complexity of the prevailing party determination,
however, the Alaska statutes also provide for exceptional cases. 82 Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Alaska has held that "it is not an immutable rule that the party
who obtains an affirmative recovery must be considered the prevailing
party .... We are of the opinion that the determination of which party
prevails... is, like the award of attorney's fees, within the discretion of the trial
judge.' 8 3
Alaska courts thus recognize that trial courts have broad discretion in
designating the prevailing party in a lawsuit.' 8 The Alaska statutes provide
ample guidance to the courts for the exercise of this discretion. For example, the
legislature has instructed the courts to consider the financial situation of all

Litigation, 56 SMU L. REv. 1115, 1117 (2003) (citing World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc.,
977 S.W.2d 662, 683 (Tex. App. 1998)).
175. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 863 S.W.2d at 235.
176. Miller & Wennihan, supra note 174, at 1116 n.6.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1119-20.
179. Id. at 1118.
180. See, e.g., ALASKAR. CIv. P. 82(a).
181. De Witt v. Liberty Leasing Co., 499 P.2d 599, 601 (Alaska 1972).
182. ALASKAR. Civ. P. 82(b)(2).
183. Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C. R. Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312,313-14 (Alaska 1972). The
Owen Jones court went on to declare the defendant the prevailing party even though the
plaintiffs had received a judgment in the amount of $7000. Id. at 314.
184. Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1321, 1326 (Alaska 1993).
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5
parties before making or enforcing an attorney fee award." The legislature has
also explicitly contemplated issues of inequity:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a court in this state may not
discriminate in the award of attorney fees and costs to or against a
party in a civil action or appeal based on the nature of the policy or
interest advocated by the party, the number of persons affected by
the outcome of the case, whether a governmental entity could be
expected to bring or participate in the case, the extent of the party's
economic incentive to bring the case, or any combination of these
factors. 86
On the whole, the Alaska model provides a good interpretation of the
discretionary rule for Oklahoma to follow.
5. The Idaho Model
The Idaho model is perhaps the best interpretation of the discretionary rule
for Oklahoma to follow. Idaho employs the identical construction in its feeshifting statutes as Oklahoma. 187 Furthermore, Idaho courts have held that an
188 Unlike Oklahoma,
award of attorney fees under the statute is mandatory.
however, Idaho courts also recognize that trial courts have full discretion to
89 The Idaho legislature
determine whether a litigant is the prevailing party.
provides courts with the following guidelines to determine which party prevails:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties, whether there were multiple claims,
multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or
other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and the extent to
which each party prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. The
trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an
action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so
finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a
fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and
185. ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010(d)(2)-(e) (2002 & Supp. 2003).
186. Id. § 09.60.010(b).
187. See IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) (1990 & Supp. 1997).
188. Sanders v. Lankford, 1 P.3d 823,826 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) ("Idaho Code Section 12120(3) provides that an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is mandatory in various
types of civil actions ....
189. Id.
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claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or
judgments obtained." °
Thus, the Idaho legislature requires courts to conduct three principal inquiries
when determining the prevailing party. Courts must consider: (1) the result
obtained by judgment or settlement in relation to the requested relief; (2) the
existence of multiple claims or issues; and (3) the extent to which the parties
prevailed on their respective issues or claims."'9 The Idaho legislature, however,
also clearly permits the courts to consider the totality of the circumstances in
making the prevailing party decision, so long as their decisions are within the
purview of the governing legal standards.' 92
D. The DiscretionaryRule in FederalJurisprudence
The discretionary rule is not limited to state law. Indeed, certain federal
statutes are premised on the discretionary model. For example, the federal
environmental fee-shifting statutes authorize attorney fee awards to any
requesting party who has significantly contributed to the goals of the statute as
determined by the court.193 Under this statutory construct, courts have the
discretion to award attorney fees to the losing party if appropriate. 94 Such
awards may provide valuable incentives for socially beneficial litigation. 95 The
possibility of attorney fee awards influences the willingness of public interest
groups to pursue litigation even when they are uncertain of their likelihood of
success.196 While this rationale does not directly pertain to the fee-shifting
statutes at issue in this comment, it does, however, support "limiting eligibility
for fee awards by means less drastic than the automatic exclusion of all losing
parties" 197- namely, by allowing courts the discretion to determine which party
has prevailed and how much it deserves.
VII. Guidelinesfor the Exercise ofJudicialDiscretion
The Oklahoma Supreme Court should adopt a discretionary rule as well as
guidelines for applying this rule to cope with the inconsistent interpretations of
190. IDAHO R. Crv. P. 54(d)(1)(B).
191. Shurtliffv. Northwest Pools, Inc., 815 P.2d 461, 464 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991).
192. Sanders, 1 P.3d at 826; Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 723 P.2d 925,931 (Idaho Ct. App.
1986) (noting that the court's discretion is "circumscribed by legal limits").
193. Awards ofAttorneys' Fees to Unsuccessful EnvironmentalLitigants,96 HARv. L. REv.
677, 680-82 (1983) [hereinafter EnvironmentalLitigants].
194. Id. at 681-82.

195. Id. at 685.
196. Id. at 685-86.
197. Id. at 687.
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the fee-shifting statutes in Oklahoma. "[C]ourts have long exercised discretion
not only in determining whether parties have prevailed, but also in deciding
whether particular prevailing parties should be awarded fees."' 98 As previously
demonstrated, legislatures often use permissive language to draft fee-shifting
statutes, granting courts the explicit authority to exercise their discretion. 9
Even when the attorney fee award is mandatory, however, state courts have
exercised full discretion to determine the prevailing party.2 "° The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that, when Congress or state legislatures have authorized
fee-shifting to encourage enforcement of some statutory scheme, the
implementing courts are properly granted "wide latitude in determining when
to grant such awards," despite the American Rule.20 Courts may consider a
variety of factors along with certain guidelines suggested by the authorizing
statute or in case law. Evidence of each possible factor is not necessary;
however, the award should be justified on some standard beyond simply the
market value of the services rendered. 2'
When interpreting discretionary fee-shifting statutes, courts may examine
whether the party requesting attorney fees has made a "substantial contribution"
to the goals outlined in the authorizing statute and whether the controversy was
of the nature fairly contemplated by the statute.20 3 Applying these tests, federal
courts have awarded attorney fees to mostly unsuccessful parties who have
nonetheless demonstrated good faith and "prudent effort" toward advancing the
goals of the underlying legislation. 2' This policy is applicable to state courts as
well.
To evaluate whether parties have made a "prudent effort," courts may judge
the effectiveness of the representation in addition to general notions of
fairness. 20 5 By considering whether a party has presented its case effectively,
courts can avoid subsidizing poorly litigated suits without significantly deterring

198. Id. at 694.
199. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(A) (2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 38.001 (1986).
200. See, e.g., Sanders v. Lankford, 1 P.3d 823 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (interpreting IDAHO
CODE § 12-120(3) (1990 & Supp. 1997)).
201. See EnvironmentalLitigants, supra note 193, at 695.
202. Miller & Wennihan, supra note 174, at 1127-28.
203. See Environmental Litigants, supra note 193, at 688-89.
204. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (interpreting the Clean Air Act); Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc. v. EPA, 484
F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) (same).
205. See Environmental Litigants, supra note 193, at 692-93.
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groups capable of pursuing complex litigation.2' Certain Burk factors also
reflect this desire to reward competence.2 7
In another test for determining the prevailing party for purposes of attorney
fee awards, courts may consider the reasonableness and necessity of such award
under the given set of facts.20 8 Factors which inform "reasonableness" and
"necessity" include, but are not limited to: (1) the merits of the claim or defense
presented by the unsuccessful party; (2) whether the litigation could have been
avoided or settled; (3) whether the successful party's efforts were superfluous to
the result; (4) the potential hardship suffered by the unsuccessful party in the
event fees are assessed; (5) the extent to which each party prevailed on its
respective claims in relation to the relief sought; (6) the novelty of the legal
question presented; (7) whether such claim or defense had previously been
adjudicated in the jurisdiction; and (8) whether the award might discourage
other parties with tenable claims or defenses from litigating or defending
legitimate issues for fear of incurring liability for substantial amounts of attorney
fees. 209
VIII. The Legislative Response
The Oklahoma legislature may need to redraft the fee-shifting statutes to
achieve the result suggested by this comment. On the other hand, given the
dearth of Oklahoma legislative history, strict construction of these statutes as
mandatory may not be a faithful interpretation. Indeed, "[t]o construe a statute
strictly is to limit its scope and its life span ....The letter killeth but the spirit

giveth life. 210 If, however, a new statute or judicial rule is necessary to coax a
discretionary rule from these statutes, the framers must expressly convey their
intent to grant trial courts the discretion to determine the prevailing party for the
purposes of attorney fee awards so as to achieve equity most efficiently. The
legislature must integrate the various constructions in an unambiguous way. It
must also provide the courts with clear guidelines regarding how this discretion
should be exercised.

206. Id. at 692.
207. Courts must consider, among other things: (1) the time and labor involved; (2) the
novelty and complexity of the issues; (3) the level of competence required for the attorney to
provide effective legal service; (4) the attorney's skill and reputation; (5) the desired recovery;
(6) the results actually obtained; and (7) the nature of the case. State ex rel. Burk v. City of
Oklahoma City, 1979 OK 115, f 8, 598 P.2d 659, 661.
208. Miller & Wennihan, supra note 174, at 1120.
209. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985).
210. Richard A. Posner, StatutoryInterpretation- In the Classroomandin the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 821 (1983).
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The most liberal construction employed by the Oklahoma legislature in the
fee-shifting statutes provides that "the Court may, in its discretion, award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. ' 211 On its face, this statutory
language is sufficient to imply that trial courts have full discretion to determine
both the prevailing party and the amount of the award. Idaho's statute employs
this exact construction yet is interpreted as giving trial courts full discretion.2 2
Because Oklahoma courts have not interpreted the fee-shifting statutes in this
way, the legislature should make this rule more explicit.
Some of the existing Oklahoma fee-shifting statutes include guidelines for the
prevailing party determination.2 3 For example, title 36, section 3629(B)
provides in pertinent part that "the prevailing party is the insurer in those cases
where judgment does not exceed written offer of settlement. In all other
judgments the insured shall be the prevailing party. ' 214 The fact that section
3629(B) is frequently litigated illustrates the inefficacy of this static definition.
The Arizona case of Schwartz v. FarmersInsurance Co. illustrates how courts
can still retain full discretion to consider the totality of the circumstances in each
case to determine the prevailing party in cases involving insurance companies
and their insureds. 215 The outcome in Schwartz is a classic application of the
discretionary rule: although the plaintiff insured obtained a money judgment,
the defendant insurance company successfully defended against the plaintiffs
bad faith claim.21 6 Given the totality of the circumstances, the Arizona court
designated the defendant as the prevailing party because it limited the plaintiff's
2 17
potential recovery so substantially.
A purely discretionary rule should not exist in a vacuum; judicial discretion
does not equate to unmitigated judicial power. Several states have incorporated
factors into their statutory scheme to provide guidance to the courts in making
the prevailing party designation.2 8 For example, certain Burk factors support
rewarding competence in much the same way as a discretionary rule would, such
as (1) the time and labor involved; (2) the novelty and complexity of the issues;
(3) the level of competence required for the attorney to provide effective legal

211. See, e.g., 78 OKLA. STAT. § 54(c) (2001).
212. See, e.g., Sanders v. Lankford, 1 P.3d 823, 826 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); Shurtliff v.
Northwest Pools, Inc., 815 P.2d 461,464 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Evans v. Sawtooth Partners,
723 P.2d 925, 931 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986).
213. See, e.g., 78 OKLA. STAT. § 54(c); 36 OKLA. STAT. § 3629(B) (2001).
214. 36 OKLA.STAT. § 3629(B).
215. Schwartz v. Farmers Ins. Co., 800 P.2d 20, 25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 25-26.
218. See supra notes 186-87, 191-92, and accompanying text; infra note 221 and
accompanying text.
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service; (4) the attorney's skill and reputation; (5) the desired recovery; (6) the
results actually obtained; and (7) the nature of the case.219 In addition to the
Burk criteria, the laws of other jurisdictions suggest helpful guidelines, such as
(1) whether the litigation could have been avoided or settled; (2) the extent to
which each party prevailed on its respective claims in relation to the relief
sought; and (3) whether an award of attorney fees might discourage other parties
from bringing legitimate claims.220
The Oklahoma legislature should adopt similar guidelines for the exercise of
judicial discretion to prevent ajudge from using "the award or denial of attorney
fees to vindicate his sense of justice beyond the judgment rendered on the
underlying dispute between the parties. ' 2 2 By adopting a discretionary rule and
providing workable guidelines for its application, Oklahoma lawmakers can
better ensure that the prevailing party in a lawsuit is determined with the
fundamental principles behind the attorney fee award firmly in mind.
IX. Conclusion
This comment urges either the Oklahoma Supreme Court or the Oklahoma
legislature to adopt the rule of law that trial courts have the discretion to
determine the prevailing party in a lawsuit for purposes of attorney fee awards.
In so doing, these bodies would not be making a radical departure from current
practice, but would merely be sanctioning the steady and deliberate retreat over
the last twenty years from the rigid, illogical, and often inequitable fee-shifting
rules first adopted in Quapaw. In the face of modern complex litigation, the
Quapaw rule is no longer workable. "[Clomplex litigation creates complex
' and trial courts need the flexibility to adapt to the
prevailing party issues,"222
changing demands of litigation in the twenty-first century. While some
attorneys may balk at the idea of giving judges even more power, others will
welcome a resolution of the prevailing party issue once and for all.
Jami Rhoades Antonisse

219. State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, 1979 OK 115, 8, 598 P.2d 659, 661
(quoting Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
220. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985).
221. Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 723 P.2d 925, 931 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986).
222. Lieber & Jones, supra note 46, at 3667.
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